Heterodox Critiques of Corporate Social Responsibility by Jo, Tae-Hee
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Heterodox Critiques of Corporate Social
Responsibility
Tae-Hee Jo
SUNY Buffalo State College
12. December 2011
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35367/
MPRA Paper No. 35367, posted 12. December 2011 19:39 UTC
Heterodox Critiques of Corporate Social Responsibility
by
Tae-Hee Jo
Economics and Finance Department
SUNY Buffalo State College
taeheejo@gmail.com
December 12, 2011
Abstract
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is in vogue in recent times. It has been
widely received by socially concerned people in business, academia, and NGOs
that CSR would lend support to the improvement in social welfare and the pro-
tection of environment. However, the question that whether corporations are
socially responsible or corporations should behave responsibly is beside the point
from the heterodox economic perspective. The proper question to pose is how cor-
porations manipulate the social by means of CSR. Drawing upon the heterodox
theory of the business enterprise along with the social provisioning perspective,
I argue that the business corporation has always acted in a socially responsible
manner by generating ethical-political-cultural values, norms, and beliefs that
legitimize whatever the business corporation does is socially responsible. In this
respect, CSR is a market-based means to control the social provisioning process
by way of creating an illusionary image of corporations and, thereby, hiding the
ruthless acquisitive drive and the exploitation of human beings and nature.
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility, social provisioning process, the business
enterprise, social welfare
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1 Introduction
The term“corporate social responsibility” (CSR) first appeared in the mid-1800s and
its frequency has been growing since the mid 20th century, with the rapid growth in
recent times (see Figure 1). A search for scholarly works on often-interchangeable CSR
terms such as socially responsible investment, corporate social performance, corporate
social accountability, business ethics, corporate citizenship shows a similar trend (see
Figure 2). These results exhibit that a sense of CSR emerged with the emergence of
corporations in the mid-1800s and that a variety of CSR is flourishing during and after
the crises of capitalism in 1930s, 1970s, and 2000s. The recent surge in CSR researches
corresponds to the growth in anti-corporate movement, environmental awareness, and
shareholder/stakeholder pressure on corporate governance (Carroll 2009; Ireland 2010;
Mele´ 2009; Soederberg 2007).
Figure 1: The appearance of “Corporate Social Responsibility” in the media, 1840-2011
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Then what is this thing called corporate social responsibility? There is an array of
CSR put into practice from different theoretical, political, and ethical perspectives.
Perhaps, the most widely received view of CSR end rsed by the dominant groups of
society—specifically, corporate executives, business and legal scholars, and the main-
stream media—is that corporate managers may, can, and do ‘sacrifice’ corporate profits
in the interest of society (Carroll 2009; Davis 2005; Reinhardt, Stavins and Vietor 2008;
Rostow 1959).1
It is also well acknowledged that progressive organizations and socially-concerned in-
vestors have put pressure on corpo ations when their bu iness actions erode human
1It should be noted that the private corporations do not ‘sacrifice’ profits. More often than not,
short-term profits are utilized for a social purpose with the expectation of making more profits. This
implies, as discussed later, that business activities including CSR are social. CSR decisions are made
strategically. Profits are not sacrificed.
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Figure 2: The appearance of CSR-related terms in the scholarly works, 1800-2009
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dignity (for example, child labor, s atshop l bor) and envi onmental conditions (for
example, oil spill, deforestation). Progressives argue that corporations should exercise
CSR in the interest of society. Notable victories are abound. For example, Nike’s
efforts to improve labor standard in its factories located in developing countries, Star-
bucks’ use of fair-trade coffee produced by African farmers, BP’s huge investment
(over $1 billion per year) in renewable energy sources, and so on. By the same stan-
dard of humanitarianism and shared prosperity, voluntary and philanthropic behaviors
of “robber barons” (for example, Cornelius Vanderbilt, John D. Rockerfeller, Andrew
Carnegie) may be deemed as socially responsible actions, regardless of their predatory
business practices (Carroll 2009; Doane 2005; Zˇizˇek 2006). Not to mention, many CSR
initiatives are driven by the state as well as international organizations.
However, hardcore neoclassical economists such as Milton Friedman and his disciples
reject CSR. They argue that profit-making is the socially responsible corporate action
that ultimately benefits the society as a whole. From this neoclassical economic per-
spective, therefore, CSR is a ‘socialist’ doctrine, using Friedman’s words, that obstructs
the efficient allocation of resources through the market mechanism and thereby it is
pointless to proceed an analysis of CSR of any kind (Friedman 1970; Karnani 2010;
The Economist 2005).
While much CSR study is done by business and legal scholars, little attempt has been
made by heterodox economists to examine CSR in a systematic manner. Two typical
heterodox positions stand out. One position is that, although it is insufficient for the
fundamental change in the mode of corporate business, CSR would reduce the tension
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between social justice and corporations’ ruthless acquisitive drive and, thereby, improve
social welfare and induce pro-social changes (Starr 2008; 2010). Radical critics of CSR,
on the other hand, argue that in spite of some visible victories in the battle against
greedy corporations, CSR movements have never challenged the core of corporate capi-
talism; the belief that CSR would push corporations to behave in the interest of society
is “naive and foolish” (Doane 2005; Hahnel 2005, 305; Hanlon 2009; Soederberg 2007).
Other notable aspects of CSR are ethical or political values that make a radical differ-
ence in the approach to CSR. But it is hardly possible to make a convincing argument
on the ethical or political ground. Empirical findings may help evaluating a specific
CSR initiative. Most empirical studies on CSR, however, appear to be inconclusive.
Therefore, rather than pursuing an ethical, political, or empirical argument, this article
examines CSR at the theoretical level drawing on heterodox theories of the business
enterprise and the social provisioning perspective. Such an approach would unravel
the theoretical underpinnings of the approaches to CSR.
The ensuing argument elaborated in the paper differs markedly from existing ap-
proaches. Heterodox economics, as opposed to neoclassical qua mainstream economics,
looks into the corporation in the context of the social provisioning process; that is, the
business enterprise exists, survives, and grows relying on and because of other actors
in society; therefore, corporate actions are social in their nature. Irresponsible or un-
accountable corporate actions would danger the survival of corporations as well as the
entire society because the the continuous provision of needy goods and services pro-
duced by corporations is the basis of the social provisioning process. Then the proper
question to pose is how corporations manipulate the social by means of CSR. Thus
the question that whether corporations are socially responsible or corporations should
behave responsibly is beside the point from the heterodox economic perspective.
In order to better understand CSR and to provide heterodox critiques of it, the paper
is structured in the following order. The second section examines the neoclassical view
of CSR. It is argued here that neoclassical economics has no choice but to reject CSR
because of its asocial theory of the firm. The third section is devoted to the heterodox
critiques of CSR, that is based upon the theory of the business enterprise combined
with the social provisioning perspective. In particular, the claims that CSR would
slow down corporations’ ruthless acquisitive drive, and that CSR would improve social
welfare are examined. The last section concludes the paper.
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2 The Economics of Irresponsibility and Corporate
Social Responsibility
2.1 Neoclassical Social Ontology and the Shareholder Value
Theory
Another suitable name for neoclassical economics may be the “economics of irrespon-
sibility.” By this name John Maurice Clark meant that neoclassical economics was
the idea of old times when self-reliance, self-control, and self-responsibility were the
norms (Clark 1916, 210, 218; see also Champlin and Knoedler 2004). Neoclassical
economics cannot be otherwise as long as the preconception of society is ahistorical,
individualistic, classless, conflictless, fraudless, static, and natural. An old but still
most widely received view of society among neoclassical economists was set forth by
Jeremy Bentham:
The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual persons who
are considered as constituting as it were its members. The interest of the
community then is, what?—the sum of the interest of the several members
who compose it. (Bentham 1969, 86)
Such a society is precisely what Milton Friedman refers to a “free society” in which:
There are no values, no “social” responsibilities in any sense other than
the shared values and responsibilities of individuals. Society is a collection
of individuals and of the various groups they voluntarily form. (Friedman
1970)
Friedman reiterates that:
in a free society... there is one and only one social responsibility of business—
to use it [sic] resources and engage in activities designed to increase its prof-
its so long as it stays within the rule of the game, which is to say, engages
in open and free competition without deception or fraud. (Friedman 1970)2
2This statement originally appeared in M. Friedman and R. Friedman. 1962. Capitalism and
Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 133.
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Being based upon the liberal (in the classical sense) view of society and the belief
in self-responsibility, neoclassical economics in principle cannot accommodate social
responsibility of any kind. Socially responsible behaviors by individuals (including a
corporation as a legal individual) are in conflict not only with methodological indi-
vidualism but also with individualistic ethos ingrained in the mind of people (of the
United State in particular).3 What logically follows is the theoretical rejection of CSR
and the practical justification of business (mis)conducts by separating business from
society. All business actions, from the neoclassical perspective, are judged only by
market principles—competition, efficiency, and vendibility. An attempt to redistribute
resources via social means is viewed as a challenge to the status quo (this is clear
when Friedman charged that CSR is a “socialist view”). This further implies that a
variant of CSR may be accepted (for example, individual entrepreneurs’ philanthropic
donations), if not promoted, provided that it is consonant with market principles and
it does not question the existing rule of the game (Henry 2007, 19-21; Ho 2009, 169;
Veblen 1904). The dominant view of CSR that corporations sacrifice their profits is
therefore not necessarily incompatible with the Friedmanian view of CSR.
Then how does such an asocial view of corporations reign over most capitalist economies
in the world? At the theoretical level, it is the shareholder value theory that helped
the dominance of the neoclassical view. This theory is endorsed by the dominant
academics (neoclassical economists and like-minded business and legal scholars) and the
practitioners (Wall Street money managers), especially in the Anglo-Saxon countries.
The shareholder value theory posits that corporate managers are agents of shareholder-
owners. The conduct of a business corporation by individual executives is responsible, if
it leads to greater profitability for the corporate ownership. However, absentee owners
are irresponsible for how profits are generated and how corporate practices influence
the community. Optimal business decisions are to be made in the sole interest of
absentee ownership. Well-functioning markets (in a particular sense that the law of
supply and demand holds and that outcomes of decisions are known with certainty) are
required to make the optimal decision by way of cost-benefit calculation. With such
a fictitious M&A market and labor market in place, it is postulated that the interest
of executives are integrated into that of shareholders. Therefore, the separation of
ownership and control disappears,4 the corporation as a legal fiction emerges therein,
and the effect of corporate activities on society is obscured thereby. The exclusive
3For the latter type of individualism with regard to welfare, see Gilens (1999, ch.2). In addition,
it may well be the case that methodological individualism and individualistic ethos have a connection
(interdependence or interaction), but this is beyond the scope of this article.
4This is a de facto corporate governance structure in some countries. In Korea, for instance,
an owner-family of a chaebol owns the minority share of the main and subsidiary corporations. At
the same time the owner-family is able to control the entire chaebol by way of cross-shareholding
and cross-trading among subsidiary corporations. For example, the Lee family owns only 0.99% of
Samsung (in 2011), but they control the entire Samsung Group (The Hankyoreh, July 27, 2011:
http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/economy/economy_general/489502.html, in Korean.)
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emphasis on shareholder value has thus contributed to the making of “Wall Street
Walk”: that is, it is irresponsible investor-shareholders who rule the governance of
corporations. In the era of money manager capitalism, the material welfare of people is
conditioned by the unstable shareholder value (Crotty 1990; Ireland 2010, 845; Lazonick
and O’Sullivan 2000, 32; Mele´ 2009, 55-62; Soederberg 2010, 44-53; Wray 2009).
2.2 The making of the corporate fiction and the neoclassical
theory of the ‘asocial’ firm
The shareholder value theory attests to the idea that corporations are in principle
excused from social responsibility and managers have only the fiduciary responsibility
for their owners. This position further brings up theoretical problems built in the
neoclassical theory of the firm.
Owing to the theoretical integration of owners’ and managers’ interests through the
market process, different types of business enterprises (proprietorships, partnerships,
and corporations) make no analytical difference since they are all treated as an owner-
worker enterprise. Only a profit-maximizing representative firm in the Marshallian
sense remains in the neoclassical theory. Furthermore, the owner-management rela-
tion, represented by the agent-principal model, is neutral, objective, and individual
(Soederberg 2010, 51). In other words, complex corporate activities and decision
making processes are reduced to the “one-dimensional framework of the individual
owner/entrepreneur/shareholder” (Ho 2009, 170). Consequently, a neoclassical firm is
defined technically (as a production function) and physically (as a set of assets), and
the value of the firm is determined in the stock market. While its concept, its actions,
and its involved relations are individual and private, a firm is a “public” entity (e.g.
a public corporation) in a peculiar sense that it is owned by a number of individual
shareholders.
Such a conception of the firm lends support to the naturalization of the corporate
fiction and the institutionalization of irresponsibility through the political-legislative
process that first took place circa mid-1800s in then rapidly industrializing capitalist
economies. The British corporate law coupled with free incorporation (in 1844) and
limited liability (in 1855), on the one hand, enabled industrial capitalists to eliminate
competition by forming joint stock companies.5 On the other hand, the interests of
the emerging rentier class were legally protected and promoted without forcing them
to take obligation, liability, and responsibility of involving in the management of the
corporation (Ireland 2010, 838-845). Likewise, the Corporate Revolution in the United
5In the US, the state of New York first introduced limited liability in 1811 and the first corporate
law was enacted in the state of Delaware in 1883.
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States between the late 1800s and the early 1900s (or more specifically the corporate
consolidation movement between 1895 and 1905) was driven by the mutual interest of
the industrial capitalists and absentee owners (Eichner 1969, 4).
The above mentioned naturalization and institutionalization could be incomplete unless
those who drive such a movement was able to universalize their vested interests; that is
to say, an illusion that the private corporations’ profit-seeking activities are beneficial
to the entire society has to be established so as to protect their dominant position in
society (Henry 2009). In other words, the neoclassical theory of the firm is an illusion
in the sense that it is divorced from the historical and social context in which the actual
business enterprise is operating. As a consequence,
As society becomes increasingly irrational, the [neoclassical] theory must
increasingly divorce itself from its social foundations, analyze increasingly
mythical and abstract notions, and thus, prove increasingly incapable of
assisting that society in attempting to solve the problems which it throws
up. That is, the theory becomes hopelessly bankrupt though considerably
more ‘elegant.’ (Henry 1990, 243)
With the politically-legally constructed form of the corporation and the dominant
shareholder value theory, a discourse on CSR is reduced to the role of managers within
the corporation and the managers’ social responsibility from an individual-ethical point
of view. As a result, while philanthropic donations are much acclaimed, the change
in the corporate governance structure in the interest of stakeholders (or society) are
not. A movement directed at changing the organizational structure of corporations is
undoubtedly regarded as the challenge to the absentee-capitalist class that made the
present form of corporations.
With regard to the role of managers of the modern corporation, there is a classic
question posed by Adolf A. Berle (1932) and E. Merrick Dodd (1932): “For whom
are corporate managers trustees?” Unequivocally, from the neoclassical viewpoint,
corporate managers are trustees of shareholders and through the market system the
profit motive of the owner-manager firm would improve social welfare. But Berle’s and
Dodd’s answers are not so simple. From the legal perspective, Berle admits that under
the system of individual ownership corporations’ sole goal is to make profits for their
shareholders. As trustees of owners, the controllers of the corporation thus have the
fiduciary responsibility for the owners. Berle, with Gardiner Means, does not stop at
this point. In an advanced capitalist economy where most major industries are domi-
nated by big corporations profit-seeking business activities are not socially beneficial,
because in major industries prices and production are administered by those big corpo-
rations in favor of themselves. That is, the supply and demand determination of price
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and quantity as well the profit maximization are irrelevant in the modern capitalist sys-
tem. Berle continues that if the economic system is organized by a different principle,
corporations and their managers would behave differently (Berle and Means 1968; Lee
1990; Lee 1998, Ch. 1).6 In response to Berle (1932), Dodd argues that the conviction
that the corporation is a “purely private enterprise” and hence its fiduciary responsi-
bility is based upon a narrow conception of the modern corporation. Alternatively, he
puts forward that the corporation as a going concern is the “economic organization of
society.” This conception lead to his assertion that the corporation is responsible not
only for its shareholders, but also for the community. The socially responsible business
conducts are, therefore, not necessarily inimical to the legal principle of the corporation
(Dodd 1932, 1161-3).
In short, according to Berle and Dodd the neoclassical theory is not only limited in
explaining the modern corporation, but also incapable of linking corporate economic
activities with the social. As a result, from the neoclassical perspective either CSR
is viewed chiefly through the market or the social impacts of corporate activities are
largely disregarded. Such a result also entails that the neoclassical theory of the firm
remains mute on the question of how the corporation survives and reproduces itself
over historical time. In order to offer a convincing answer to this question, we need to
overcome the asocial theory of the firm and to provide an analysis of the the institu-
tional arrangements surrounding corporations and active social agency in the face of
fundamental uncertainty and instability.
3 Heterodox Economics and Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility
3.1 Corporations in the Social Provisioning Process
The heterodox theory of the business enterprise is a set of cross-fertilized ideas influ-
enced by, among others, Marxians, radical political economists, institutionalists, Post
Keynesians, and social economists. Common to those heterodox traditions is the treat-
ment of the business enterprise (in particular, the modern corporation) as a real entity,
6What is implied here is that a society organized by social principles, rather than business prin-
ciples, is conceivable. In such a society, it is quite reasonable to think of the social responsibility of
corporations, but not in the current socio-economic system. This point brings up Veblen who argues
that the industrial society is organized predominantly by the business principles coinciding with the
interest of managers and absentee owners and thereby social welfare and culture are configured by
the actions of the business enterprise (Veblen 1904, 157-8; Veblen 1921, 40-1; Veblen 1964, 10). This
point is discussed further later.
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an emergent institution, and a social organization that directs the capitalist social
provisioning process. Therefore the business enterprise is irreducible to individuals
(Veblen 1904; Eichner 1976, ch.2; Baran and Sweezy 1966; O’Hara and Sherman 2004;
Lee 1998; Lee 2010; Lutz 1999, 165-191).7
By a real entity meant that the business enterprise is a real acting agent that makes
such decisions as investment, employment, and production so as to achieve its goals—
notably, monetary profits, survival, growth, and socio-economic power. As a real agent
the business enterprise runs in historical time. This implies that the business enterprise
is a going concern whose decision-making process is path-dependent. When it comes
to the corporation characterized by the separation of ownership and control and by the
hierarchical structure, the strategic decision making process becomes more complicated.
Therefore, profit maximization calculation—that is, isolated optimal decision making—
by the “firm” has no real correspondence and the neoclassical theory of the firm is not
applicable to the real corporation.
By an emergent institution meant that the business enterprise is fundamentally differ-
ent from individual persons as well as aggregated individuals. The business enterprise
has its own goals and means that are not necessarily consistent with those of individual
owners, managers, and workers. Likewise, the sum of individual business enterprises
is not linearly converted into markets or industries. Cartels, trade associations, trusts,
and joint ventures, for instance, are higher-level emergent institutions that are delib-
erately organized by business enterprises. Two methodological implications can be
pointed out. Firstly, both methodological individualism and methodological holism
break down. Secondly, a theory of the business enterprise as a real-emergent entity
is to take into account human agency (human intentionality and activity), surround-
ing socio-economic structures, and causal mechanisms (that is, the strategic decision-
making process) without resorting to aggregation or disaggregation (Lawson 2003; Lee
2002; 2010).
For the present discussion of CSR, the heterodox view that the business enterprise is
a social organization is particularly relevant. As discussed earlier, the corporation is
a social creation; the introduction of and the naturalization of the corporate fiction
in the 19th century was rendered possible by the political-legal process which was
mainly driven by the emerging rentier class. What followed historically was the creation
of liberal values, norms, and beliefs that were necessary to protect the ruling class
and to legitimize corporate actions.8 Embedded in the capitalist society, therefore,
7In this light, the new institutionalist theory of the firm—that is, a firm is a transaction cost
minimizing institution in parallel to the market institution—fails to capture the distinction between
the business enterprise (as a real agent) and the market (as a social structure). As a result, it is hardly
possible for new institutionalists to analyze how markets are governed by business enterprises as well
as the state.
8The making of neoclassical economics that helped establishing liberal values in the late 19th
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corporations as social agency have social lives, with uncertain life span, connected
through social relations and socio-economic structures. Together with the actions of
the state and households, business activities constitute the social provisioning process
that is a “continuous, non-accidental series of production-based, production derived
economic activities through historical time” (Lee and Jo 2011, 859). Hence all business
activities are social in the sense that their actions take place and have meanings only
in the social context (Gruchy 1987, 21-2; Ireland 2010; Jo 2011b; Lee 2008; Lee 2009;
Polanyi 1968; Power 2004).
In a nutshell, the heterodox account of the modern business enterprise as a real-
emergent-social organization breaks up the dichotomy between the social and the eco-
nomic and, hence, offers the theoretical basis for evaluating corporate actions form
the social provisioning perspective. We now turn to the discussion of CSR from the
heterodox economic perspective.
3.2 Corporate Social Responsibility from the Heterodox Eco-
nomic Perspective
From the heterodox economic perspective just outlined, the assertions that profit-
making is the socially responsible corporate action and that corporate managers may,
can, and do sacrifice corporate profits in the interest of society are off the mark. The
former stance taken by neoclassical economists is problematic inasmuch as corporations
are treated as a fictional-individual-asocial entity. Moreover, the neoclassical view of
CSR is readily refuted on the empirical ground that, for example, the rate of growth
in corporate profits (or income earned by top 1%) has been much higher than that of
national income (or income earned by the 99% of the population) in the US.9
The profit-sacrifice view is also misleading. Although many corporations these days
include social concerns in their annual reports, there are numerous evidences of cor-
porations’ unethical, anti-human, anti-environment business practices—for example,
double or fake bookkeeping to comply with the labor standards, being against min-
imum wage legislations and environmental regulations (e.g. US. Clean Air Act, the
Montreal Protocol) (see, Doane 2005; Jenkins 2009; Soederberg 2007). The upshot is
century society was the outcome of the changes in socio-economic structures and relationships. This
is precisely the point that John F. Henry is arguing in his book: “[T]he [neoclassical] theory reflects the
dominant relationships within capitalist society and has been developed and modified to accommodate
changes within this form of social organization. Hence, neoclassicism does not stand above or apart
from society, but is, as with all social ideas, conditioned by that society. This calls into question the
claim of scientific neutrality, held to be a hallmark of neoclassical economics” (Henry 1990, xvii).
9See, the Economic Policy Institute Report, “Data on income gains support 99ers gripes” (http:
//www.epi.org/publication/data-income-gains-support-99ers, accessed October 22, 2011.)
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that corporations may, can, and do utilize CSR for the sake of profits, survival, and
growth. If a socially responsible action is inimical to profitability, not profitability but
responsibility is likely to be abandoned. Suffice it to say that corporations strategically
use their resources in order to reproduce themselves; ethical, humanitarian, or social
concern is at most epiphenomenal. No strong legal enforcement, furthermore, has ever
been exercised to promote CSR.10 More to the point, historically CSR has never been
alien to corporate activities since the advent of the corporate form. CSR has appeared
like waves, especially after economic debacles, while taking slightly different faces. Ap-
parently, the current vogue is voluntary CSR practices by transnational corporations
(Carroll 2009).
Then has the 150 year old CSR movement slowed down corporations’ ruthless acquisi-
tive drive? Has it contributed to the improvement in social welfare? Or, has it changed
the nature of capitalist corporations or corporate capitalism? A careful examination of
such questions is warranted because many socially conscious progressives and heterodox
economists believe CSR will bring about positive effects on society and environment.
In what follows an attention is given to business actions in relation to social welfare.
Has corporations changed?
Various heterodox economists have long argued that the capitalist economic system is
inherently unstable due to self-destabilizing market forces. Instability in the economic
system derives from fundamental uncertainty in historical time; this further implies the
business enterprise as a going concern and agency (that is, the capability of making
strategic business decisions). The insoluble problem under capitalism is that business
enterprises generate instability and because of the very reason the reproduction of the
business enterprise is not guaranteed. To make matters worse, the business enterprises
together with the capitalist state have driven economy more market-oriented and hence
more unstable (Keynes 1936; Marx 1990; Veblen 1904; 1964; Minsky 1986).
To stay alive at least and to reproduce themselves eventually, business enterprises have
to stabilize themselves, markets, and economy. Stabilization requires the control of
micro- and macro-instability. Control implies power. And power is endemic to the
class-based capitalist social structure. It is the capitalist class agents—the business
enterprise and the state—that control the social provisioning process in their own
interests. The means to control the provisioning process by the business enterprise
takes various forms. Corporate governance, on the one hand, involves establishing
the set of rules directing the conducts of constituent actors—managers, owners, and
workers. Market governance, on the other hand, includes, but not limited to, managing
10While a CSR practice is legally allowed, whether CSR is legally enforced by the state is another
matter. In the US, seven states allow charitable donations out of corporate profits, nineteen states
allow donations for the sake of public welfare, and twenty four states do not specify whether such an
action is allowed or not (Reinhardt, Stavins and Vietor 2008, 222).
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market prices and quantity, organizing the network between competitors, and making
market rules by way of trade associations, cartels, trusts, and joint-ventures (Fligstein
1990; 2001; Jo 2011a; forthcoming; Lee 2010; Prechel 2000).
The business enterprise embedded in the social provisioning process implies that what
has changed over the past 150 years is the means to control enterprises themselves,
markets, and economy in the face of changing socio-economic structures. For instance,
current neoliberal corporate capitalism requires the unquestioned premise that the ex-
isting system is basically good, and that it could be better if it is left unchecked (in the
neoclassical case) or if market failure is complemented by voluntary CSR practices (as
in the profit-sacrifice view). In this respect, CSR can be viewed as a soft, market-based
form of control. CSR also helps to manufacture the illusional image of corporations
that cause instability, debacles, and frauds. According to this illusion, the corporation
is a benevolent entity that creates wealth for the entire society and that provides the
well-being for the underlying population. As a consequence, a neutral, naturalized,
legitimized, benevolent, philanthropic business corporation remains, whereas the ruth-
less acquisitive drive and the exploitation of human beings and nature are concealed
(Hanlon 2009; Lee 1996; Soederberg 2007; Zˇizˇek 2006).
Has CSR improved social welfare?
One widely received belief connected to the illusionary image of the corporation is that
‘what is good for the business enterprise is good for the society as a whole’ or ‘social
welfare can be improved by private business activities.’ This belief can readily be
disillusioned by heterodox economic theory—more specifically, the surplus approach
coupled with the theory of effective demand in the context of the capitalist social
provisioning process delineated earlier.
Heterodox economists do not endorse the idea that welfare is determined through
the market mechanism. Alternatively, welfare determination is situated in the social
process of production. To illustrate, the business enterprise determines how much
surplus goods and services (consumption, investment, government goods and services)
should be produced. Such a decision in turn determines the total social product (its
level and composition) through output-employment multiplier. Employment decisions
follow and wage incomes are given to workers so them to purchase surplus goods and
services. In this regard, the production of social surplus is embedded in the principle of
effective demand. What this production process implies is that workers’ welfare is a sort
of residual that is determined by business enterprises’ expenditure decisions. Without
wage income, workers are not able to engage in economic, social, political, and cultural
activities to sustain their socially constructed lifestyle. Since the primary concern of the
private business enterprise is its survival and expansion over time, welfare improvement
is not guaranteed by market activities. Moreover, there is a socially allowed standard
of welfare, that is governed by social institutions (for example, the welfare state) and
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the social relations between classes (Lee and Jo 2011).11
A couple of important implications with regard to CSR follow from the above theoret-
ical discussion. First, CSR is part of strategic business activities that are deliberately
put into practice so as to control the social provisioning process and eventually to
reproduce the business enterprise. Therefore the claim that CSR would lend support
to the improvement in social welfare and social justice is theoretically untenable and
historically ungrounded. It is hardly imagined (or observed) that in class society con-
flicting interests get reconciled through the sacrifice of the minority ruling class. To
completely remove conflicting interests, either all the classes should be eliminated or
one dominant class must control the entire society by “force and fraud.” In this re-
spect, CSR is, I would argue, a form of fraud, in the Veblenian sense (Veblen 1919,
117; Veblen 1964, 442; Henry 2011).
Secondly, it may well be said that the business enterprise has always acted in a socially
responsible manner by generating ethical-political-cultural values, norms, and beliefs
that legitimize whatever the business enterprise does is socially responsible. That is
to say, CSR is a rhetorical means to control the social provisioning process in the
interest of the business enterprise. CSR, like other means of market governance, is not
a threat to corporate capitalism; rather it is a managerial apparatus that will help to
save business enterprises and eventually corporate capitalism.
4 Conclusion
Corporate social responsibility is in vogue in recent times. It has been widely received
by socially concerned people in business, academia, and NGOs that CSR would lend
support to the improvement in social welfare and environmental conditions. Indeed,
no one would deny the fact that the CSR movement has made many notable pro-social
outcomes.
This paper is not meant to argue whether CSR is good or bad for society and for the
corporation. Such an argument has been put forth on the ethical, political, or empirical
ground. What is missing in those studies is an analysis that unravels the reason why
private corporations have been de facto exercising CSR practices that are superficially
contradictory to the mode of corporate capitalism. This is the puzzle that neoclassical
economics and its theory of the firm in particular is unable to solve.
11This is not the Sraffian type surplus approach, but the surplus approach enhanced by both the
principle of effective demand and the social provisioning perspective. For more detailed exposition of
‘heterodox’ social surplus approach, see Lee and Jo (2011).
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Heterodox economic theory offers a critical view of CSR. The modern business enter-
prise is a real-emergent-social agency that controls the capitalist social provisioning
process so as to survive and reproduce itself. That is to say, all business activities are
social in the sense that they take place and have meanings only in the social context.
Under fundamental uncertainty in the real world, instability in the economic system
has to be stabilized. Stabilization or control requires power. And power is endemic to
a class society. The means to control the unstable capitalist social provisioning process
takes many forms. In this regard, CSR can be viewed as a soft, market-based means
to control the social provisioning process by way of creating an illusionary image of
corporations and, thereby, hiding the ruthless acquisitive drive and the exploitation
of human beings and nature. The heterodox approach based upon the social sur-
plus approach coupled with the principle of effective demand also rejects the assertion
that CSR would improve social welfare. In this theoretical perspective, the welfare
of the general public is a residual that is subservient to the business enterprise that
makes strategic expenditure decisions on production and employment. In conclusion,
the business enterprise or the corporation in particular has always acted in a socially
responsible manner by generating ethical-political-cultural values, norms, and beliefs
that legitimize whatever the business enterprise does is socially responsible. Therefore,
CSR is a form of fraud.
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